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Abstract 
 
We suggest a probabilistic voting model where voters’ preferences for alternative public goods display 
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1.  Introduction 
 
A hundred days into George W. Bush’s presidency, The Economist entitled its cover story “That 
shocking conservative”. The story was about the common perception among political commentators 
and pundits of a president pushing a much more conservative agenda, on e.g. tax cuts, than his 
campaign platform had suggested.1 Glaeser et al. (2005) provide more systematic evidence showing 
that politicians sometimes implement policies that are more extreme than their political platforms. 
They report that Democrats and Republicans in the US on the one hand have very similar, moderate 
platforms on tax policy. On the other hand evidence reveals rather big differences in mean tax rates 
between Democratic and Republican administrations. 
 Why would an elected politician want to pursue more extreme policies than his party platform 
suggests? One possibility is that party leaders have extreme preferences (Alesina, 1988) which in turn 
can lead to implementation of more extreme policies than indicated by the electoral platforms (Glaeser 
et al., 2005). While politicians’ ideological preferences are important, we would still expect that the 
desire for re-election would moderate policies that seem extreme relative to voters’ preferences. 
This paper demonstrates that extreme policies in terms of a more polarized resource allocation 
may occur not because the incumbent has extreme preferences, but because it makes the incumbent’s 
desired future policy appeal to a larger group of voters. More specifically, we suggest that voters’ 
preferences are characterized by reference levels that are affected by current policies, and politicians 
can use this link strategically to influence the probability of re-election.  
We consider a political framework where potential partisan governments disagree with respect 
to the composition of public spending as in Alesina and Tabellini (1990) (henceforth “AT”) and 
Tabellini and Alesina (1990) (henceforth “TA”). Crucially, we suggest that voters’ utility of a given 
level of spending on each public good depends not just on the current supply, but also on how that 
level compares to what they are used to, i.e. their habit level. Comparing to a benchmark case of a 
certain re-election, this gives the incumbent incentives to implement more polarized allocations. By 
supplying more today of his most preferred public good, the incumbent can push up voters’ habit 
levels and correspondingly their future marginal utility of this good. This will increase the probability 
of re-election. 
The assumption that preferences are characterized by reference dependence in the form of 
habit formation has been explored in many branches of economics recently. (Though, to our 
knowledge, this paper represents the first attempt in the field of political economy.) It is most common 
in studies of consumption; see Deaton (1992) for a survey.2 It has more recently proved to be 
                                                 
1 See The Economist, 28 April 2001, North America edition. Fiorina (1999) offers a more detailed discussion of 
how and why US politics has changed from being centrist during the 1950s and 60s to being increasingly 
polarized during the later decades. 
2 The general idea of habit formation in consumption seems to be formulated by James Duesenberry, see for 
example Duesenberry (1949). Other early contributions include Ryder and Heal (1973) and Easterlin (1974). 
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successful in stochastic, consumption-based analyses of asset prices, see for example Campbell and 
Cochrane (1999), and also in studies of growth (Carroll et al., 2000) and stabilization policy 
(Ljungqvist and Uhlig, 2000). Habit formation implies that the satisfaction an individual realizes from 
a given consumption level tends to depend more on the change in consumption (i.e. the deviation 
between actual consumption and a historically determined habit level) than on the level itself. This is 
in accordance with psychological research that suggests that individuals’ satisfaction is determined by 
actual outcome relative to some reference level, see Fredrick and Loewenstein (1999) and Rabin 
(1998, 2002). As highlighted by Campbell and Cochrane (1999: 208): “Habit formation captures a 
fundamental feature of psychology: Repetition of a stimulus diminishes the perception of the stimulus 
and responses to it”.  
 Traditionally, the assumption of habit formation has been related to individuals’ private 
consumption. We will argue, however, that habit formation is equally important for any voter’s 
preferences for most types of public goods. For example, habit formation seems crucial for voters’ 
welfare assessments of the spending levels on essential public goods like schools and education, health 
services, roads and most types of infrastructure. Solnick and Hemenway (2005) report preliminary 
evidence in favor of reference dependence in the evaluation of public goods.3 
Models of political behavior generally assume that voters’ policy preferences are exogenous to 
actual policies.4 Recent evidence suggests, however, that there may be important feedback effects 
from economic policy to individual preferences. Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) use the German 
reunification of 1990 as a “natural experiment” to test the relationship between political regime and 
individual preferences. They strongly conclude that there is a causal link from policies to preferences. 
Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln identify the fact that people “get used to” certain policies as one of the 
reasons for this link. Our model takes this fact seriously in the sense that we model how current 
policies determine habits and the future preferences of the voters.  
 We are not the first to analyze how political extremism can appear for strategic (i.e. vote-
maximizing) reasons. Glaeser et al. (2005) present a model where strategic extremism occurs because 
it energizes the incumbent’s core constituents more than it energizes the opponent’s supporters. Note, 
however, that they focus on extreme platforms rather than actual policies. Indeed, their model predicts 
that extremism in policies is due to extreme preferences of candidates, whereas platform extremism 
occurs for strategic reasons. Our analysis shows that extreme actual policies also can occur for 
strategic reasons. We share this feature with Glazer et al. (1998). They explore a model where an 
                                                 
3 Note that Solnick and Hemenway analyze positional concerns as determinants of reference levels, analogous to 
external habit formation in some other contributions to this literature. 
4 An exception is retrospective voting models where voters punish the incumbent by voting against him if he 
acted against their interest when in office. In contrast to this backward-looking model, voters are fully forward-
looking in our set-up. We also note that models of directional voting (see Rabinowitz and Macdonald, 1989) give 
the status quo a central role in voting behavior. As in our analysis, this model incorporates a reference point in 
decision making. Unlike in our model, however, the reference point gives voters incentives to vote strategically; 
our reference points give politicians incentives to act strategically. 
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incumbent has incentives to implement extreme policies because it creates a cost to voters of changing 
powers. Their results hinge critically on the assumptions that there is a fixed cost associated with a 
policy change and that politicians are (partly) office motivated. This contrast our model where parties 
are outcome oriented and the election winner can implement preferred policies without any frictions.  
 Our paper is closely related to the strategic debt literature initiated by Aghion and Bolton 
(1990), Persson and Svensson (1989), AT (1990) and TA (1990).5 Building on the models of AT and 
(particularly) TA, we explore a model where different potential governments disagree about the 
composition of public goods provision.6 As extensions, we include probabilistic voting and habit 
formation in voters’ preferences for public goods. It turns out that the extreme resource allocation of 
the incumbent is accompanied by a strategic debt bias. This debt bias is caused exclusively by the 
incumbent’s attempt to influence the probability of re-election. As explained in more detail below, it 
complements the strategic debt effects identified by AT and TA. 
The next section of this paper presents our model, and briefly discusses the benchmark case 
where the initial government is certain about re-election. Section 3 considers equilibrium policies 
when the incumbent acts strategically in the face of uncertainty about re-election. Section 4 offers 
some final remarks. 
 
 
2. An intertemporal model with probabilistic voting  
 
Adopting the probabilistic voting approach of Persson and Tabellini (2000, section 13.3), we consider 
a political environment consisting of two competing political parties (J = D, R) with two associated 
natural constituencies in the form of identically large groups of voters (j = d, r). The two parties are 
outcome oriented and, following AT (1990) and TA (1990), they disagree about the composition of 
public spending. As TA, we consider a two-period framework. For simplicity, we disregard 
discounting of utility and assume that the real interest rate is zero.  
 
Parties 
Party J is characterized by the period-utility function  
(1) t
J
t
JJ
t gfu log)1(log αα −+= , 
where tf  and tg  are the spending levels on the two public goods in period t, t = 1,2. The parameter 
Jα , 10 ≤≤ Jα , captures the preferences of party J for the composition of the goods. Party R attaches 
                                                 
5 This strategic debt literature is part of the broader literature on how an incumbent can influence potential 
successors by altering alternative state variables. For example, Cukierman et al. (1992) apply this idea to taxation 
while Glazer (1989) considers the choice of public investments in this context.  
6 The alternative approach taken by Persson and Svensson (1989) is to assume that governments disagree about 
the public spending level vs. private consumption.   
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a higher weight to the utility of tf  than party D, i.e. 
DR αα >  and we assume, as Persson and 
Tabellini, that 2
11 >−= DR αα . For concreteness, we assume that the period 1 incumbent is a R-
government. Because the model is symmetric in every aspect, all results generalize directly to the case 
of an incumbent D-government.  
 The government in each period is endowed with one unit of output and has access to a perfect 
global financial market. Thus, the resource constraints are given by 
(2a) bgf +=+ 111  
and 
(2b) bgf −=+ 122 , 
where b is public debt. 
 In period 1 the incumbent R-government faces an endogenous probability, Π , of not being re-
elected for period 2. If  re-elected, the R-government sets its preferred policy, Rff 22 =  and Rgg 22 = . 
If replaced, the policy of the succeeding D-government must be accepted,  Dff 22 =  and Dgg 22 = . 
Thus, the R-incumbent determines optimal policy in terms of 1f , 1g  and, consequently, b, by the 
maximization of 
(3) ( ) ( )RRRDDRR gfugfugfu 222222111 ,)1(,),( Π−+Π+ , 
subject to (1), (2a) and (2b) and given perfect knowledge about i) how Π  depends on the chosen 
policy and ii) how the alternative D-government will behave in period 2 if elected. Our modeling of 
the voters’ preferences will imply that Π  is a function of both the intra-period split between 1f  and 
1g  as well as the intertemporal distribution of resources (b).  
Analyzing how the incumbent will utilize the link between policy-choices and Π , we will 
compare the outcome with a benchmark case of  a certain re-election for the R-government, i.e. Π = 0. 
It follows from (1), (2a), (2b) and (3), that our benchmark is given by 
(4)  Rtf α= ,  )1( Rtg α−=  and  0=b , for 2,1=t . 
 
Voters 
The utility of voter i in group j is given by 
(5) Dijjj Kuu )(21 δσ +++ , 
where jtu  is the period t utility of  the provided package of public spending.
7 The dummy variable 
DK  is one in the case of party D holding office in period 2 and zero in the case of party R. Moreover, 
ijσ  is an idiosyncratic bias in group j for party D, reflecting non-economic ideological factors, and δ  
                                                 
7 Following TA (1990), we abstract from private consumption decisions. 
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is an aggregate popularity shock. The distributions of ijσ  and δ  are uniform with zero means and 
densities that are similar across the parties and equal to respectively φ  and ψ . 
 The period-utility functions of the voters in group j are given by 
(6) t
j
t
jj
t GFu log)1(log αα −+=   (t = 1, 2), 
where tF  and tG  are the surplus spending levels on the two public goods, reflecting our specification 
of habit formation in the voters’ preferences for public goods. We have that 
(7a) 1−−= ttt ffF γ , 
and 
(7b) 1−−= ttt ggG γ , 
where γ , 10 <≤ γ , indicates the strength of the habit formation mechanism (andγ  = 0 implies 
additive separable preferences). The magnitudes of 0f  and 0g  are given by history. We assume that 
the relevant values of γ  ensure 0>tF  and 0>tG . 
 Capturing that group j is the natural constituency of party J, we assume that rR αα =  and 
dD αα = . Still, the existence of ideological concerns and popularity shocks, as introduced in (5), and 
habit formation may all imply that segments of the voters may take voting decisions that are not in 
accordance with their constituency. 
 A crucial feature of the model is the fact that voters’ preferences are characterized by habit 
formation, while this is not the case for the preferences of the parties. This reflects two priorities. First, 
we wish in particular to highlight that voters’ preferences are endogenously determined by policies. 
This is modeled by a mechanism that is more transparent if the parties’ preferences do no change in 
response to the implemented policies. Second, studies of party manifestos suggest that political 
parties’ policy preferences are relatively stable over time. Using post WWII time series data for 25 
democracies, Budge and Klingemann (2001) report that - while there are some changes in party 
positions over time - estimated party preferences within individual countries do generally not leapfrog 
or overlap. Hence, it seems reasonable to assume that political parties to a large extent represent basic 
ideas, and implied views about resource allocation, that remain more stable over time than the 
preferences of large segments of the voters. 
  
 
3. The political equilibrium 
 
The timing of the political decisions is as follows: In period 1 the R-incumbent sets its preferred policy 
in terms of 1f , 1g  and b. There is no room for policy commitment. An election is held at the start of 
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period 2. The winning party then sets period 2 policy in terms of 2f  and 2g . As usual, we solve the 
model backwards. 
 
Post election policy 
Assume that party J wins the election. The chosen period 2 policy is then determined by the 
maximization of Ju2 , see (1), subject to (2b) when b is inherited from period 1. This yields 
(8a) )1()(2 bbf
JJ −= α  
and 
(8b) )1)(1()(2 bbg
JJ −−= α . 
Utilizing the period 1 budget constraint, (2a), it follows from (7a), (7b), (8a) and (8b) that the realized 
period 2 surplus spending levels, JFF 22 =  and JGG 22 = , can be written as (reaction-) functions of 1f  
and 1g :  
(9a) 111112 )2(),( fgfgfF
JJ γα −−−= , 
(9b) 111112 )2)(1(),( ggfgfG
JJ γα −−−−= . 
An increase in the period 1 spending on one of the goods, say 1f , has two distinct effects on the period 
2 surplus spending levels. The direct “habit effect“ lowers the period 2 surplus spending on the same 
good through a higher habit level, i.e. the effect of 1f  on the last term on the RHS of (9a). In addition, 
there is a “debt effect” that lowers both surplus spending levels, i.e. the first term on the RHS of both 
(9a) and (9b). 
 
Voting decisions 
Turning to voting decisions, we define ju2  as the difference in period 2 utility for group j if party D 
rather than party R wins the election. It follows from (6) that 
(10) ( ) ( )RDjRDjj GGFFu 22222 loglog)1(loglog −−+−= αα . 
Being perfectly informed about the intensions of the alternative governments, voter i from group j will 
choose to vote for party D if ( )δσ +−> jij u2 , see (5). Normalizing the size of each of the two groups 
to 2
1 , it follows (as seen by the illustration in Figure 1) that the number of voters for party D is 
(11) ( ) ( ) ( ) δφφφδφδ +++=⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ +++⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ ++= rdrdD uuuuN 2222 212121212121 . 
 
*** Figure 1 *** 
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*** Figure 2 ***  
 
We have that ( )2111 Prob),( >=Π DNgf . Recalling that the popularity shock, δ , is uniformly 
distributed with a zero mean and a density equal to ψ , it follows from (11) that 
(12) ( )rd uugf 2211 2121),( ++=Π ψ , 
see Figure 2. Consequently, in order to investigate how the period 1 policy influences the probability 
of re-election, we have to consider the derivatives: 
(13a) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +=Π
1
2
1
2
1 2
1
df
ud
df
ud
df
d rdψ  , 
(13b) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +=Π
1
2
1
2
1 2
1
dg
ud
dg
ud
dg
d rdψ . 
From (9a), (9b), (10) and the assumption that DR αα −=1 , we derive 
(14a) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −=+ RDDRDDDR
rd
FGGFFFdf
ud
df
ud
2222221
2
1
2 11)1(1111 ααγ , 
where the first term on the RHS captures the habit effect as defined above and the two remaining 
terms capture the debt effect. Using (9a) and (9b), we collect the last two terms and rewrite (14a): 
(14b) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−−+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −=+ RD
D
DR
D
DR
rd
GFGF
gf
FFdf
ud
df
ud
2222
11
221
2
1
2 1)(11 ααγγ . 
Because DR αα >  and, accordingly, DR FF 22 > , the habit effect is negative. This reflects that a higher 
habit level reduces voters’ utility of given levels of Jf 2 . Because 
RD ff 22 < , the concavity of the 
utility function implies that the drop in all voters’ utility is larger in the case of a D-government than 
for a R-government.  
Noting that the term in brackets in the last part of the RHS of (14b) is negative (as shown in 
the Appendix), we conclude that the debt effect has the opposite sign of )( 11 gf − . This reflects that a 
higher debt reduces both Jf 2  and 
Jg 2 , which lower voters’ surplus spending levels disproportionally, 
depending on the magnitudes of the habit levels, 1fγ  vs. 1gγ . If  11 gf > , the drop in JF2  is more 
painful than the drop in JG2 , implying that all voters’ assessment of the political parties are tilted in 
the favour of the R-government that will ensure the smallest reduction in 2f . Correspondingly, the 
case of 11 gf <  implies a debt effect that favors voters’ assessment of the R-party. Summing up, it 
follows for 0>γ  that the expression in (14b) is strictly negative if 11 gf ≥  and ambiguous if 11 gf < . 
 8
 The derivation of how rd uu 22 +  responds to changes in 1g  is analogous. Using (9a), (9b) and 
(10), we derive 
(15) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−−+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −=+ RD
D
DR
D
DR
rd
GFGF
gf
GGdg
ud
dg
ud
2222
11
221
2
1
2 1)(11 ααγγ . 
The habit effect of a higher 1g  favors party D, i.e. the first term on the RHS is positive, while the debt 
effect also favors party D if 11 fg > . Provided that 0>γ , the expression in (16) is therefore strictly 
positive if 11 fg ≥  and ambiguous if 11 fg < . 
 Returning to the effects on the probability of re-election of changes in respectively 1f  and 1g  
(including the induced debt effect), we observe from (13a) and (13b) that they are proportional to the 
derivatives in (14b) and (15). The effects are also proportional to the magnitude of the density ψ . As 
illustrated in Figure 2, this simply reflects that a higher ψ implies that a given change in rd uu 22 +  will 
influence the voting behavior of a larger group of voters. Moreover, it follows from (14b) and (15) that 
the ability of the incumbent to use current policies to influence Π  hinges on the habit formation 
mechanism, i.e. 0>γ .8 If 0=γ , our model simplifies to a log-utility version of the TA (1990) 
framework, which features an exogenous probability of re-election.  
 
Equilibrium policy 
Using (1), (8a), (8b), (2a) and the condition RD αα −=1 , we rewrite the expected utility function of 
the R-incumbent, (3), as 
(3b) ),()2log(log)1(log 111111 gfBAgfgf
RR Π++−−+−+ αα . 
Here A and B are negative constants (recall that DR αα > ), 
(16) 0)1log()1(log <−−+= RRRRA αααα , 
(17) ( ) 0)1log(log)21( <−−−= RRRB ααα . 
 Maximization of (3b) with respect to 1f  and 1g  yields the first-order conditions 
(18a) 0
2
1
1111
=Π+−−− df
dB
gff
Rα , 
(18b) 0
2
11
1111
=Π+−−−
−
dg
dB
gfg
Rα . 
                                                 
8 Comparing to the probabilistic voting framework of Persson and Tabellini (2000, section 13.3), we note that 
the ability of the incumbent to influence the probability of re-election in their model hinges completely on the 
assumption that the uniform distributions for iRσ  and iDσ  have different densities. By the assumption of a 
similar density ψ ,  this mechanism is deliberately disregarded in our model.   
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It is useful first to consider the corner case of no habit formation mechanism, i.e. 0=γ , which implies 
that 0
1
=Πdfd  and 01 =Πdgd . We then obtain Rf α=1 , )1(1 Rg α−=  and, from (2a), b = 0. This is 
equivalent to the benchmark case of a certain re-election, see (4). The intuition follows from TA 
(1990). When Π  is exogenous and less than one, the incumbent on the one hand benefits from 
increased debt because it provides more of the most preferred composition of public spending today 
and, as a consequence of less total future spending, it also “forces” the potential alternative 
government to set the composition of public spending in period 2 closer to the incumbent’s 
preferences. One the other hand, increased debt harms the incumbent because it implies a less smooth 
utility profile over time. The degree of concavity in the utility function determines whether a debt or 
surplus bias is optimal on strategic grounds.9 It turns out that log utility is the borderline case where 
the two opposite effects exactly cancel out. In the context of the present paper that assumes log utility 
at the outset, this is a useful property because it allows us to focus exclusively on the strategic effects 
of current policies on Π . 
 From (18a) and (18b), we obtain 
(19) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ Π−Π=−−
1111
1
df
d
dg
dB
gf
RR αα . 
Using (13a), (13b), (14b) and (15), it is straightforward to verify that 
(20) 01111
2
1
222211
>
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ Π−Π DRDR FFGGdf
d
dg
d ψγ  for 0>γ . 
Recalling that the constant B is strictly negative, see (17), we conclude from (19) that: 
 
PROPOSITION 1: When 0>γ , the period 1 R-incumbent sets 1f  and 1g  such that R
R
g
f
α
α
−> 11
1 . 
 
Comparing to the benchmark case of a certain re-election (see (4)), or the case with an exogenous re-
election probability (γ = 0), this proposition implies that the incumbent chooses a more polarized 
allocation between the two public goods in the sense that the magnitude of the gap 011 >− gf  has 
increased. Thus, rather than to cater to the middle as predicted by a median voter model, the 
incumbent’s political-strategic reasoning leads him to choose a more extreme intra-period distribution 
of the two public goods. 
 In order to consider debt policy, we note that the first-order conditions (18a) and (18b) imply 
(21) ( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ Π+Π−−+=+
1
1
1
11111 22
11
dg
dg
df
dfBgfgf . 
                                                 
9 In the extreme case of completely opposite preferences, 1)1( =−= DR αα , a debt bias is always optimal when 
1<Π  because the incumbent will regard the alternative government’s spending as pure waste. 
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Because B < 0 and 0)2( 11 >−− gf , it follows that 111 >+ gf  if the term in brackets on the RHS is 
strictly negative. As demonstrated in the Appendix, this condition is satisfied when 0>γ . Thus: 
 
PROPOSITION 2: Given 0>γ , b > 0. 
 
Moreover, from Proposition 1 and Proposition 2, we immediately obtain: 
 
PROPOSITION 3: Given 0>γ , the R-incumbent sets Rf α>1 . 
 
Consequently, the incumbent’s choice of polarization in the sense of an increased gap between f1 and 
g1 involves an increase in the supply of his most preferred good - as compared to the case of a certain 
re-election. 
Propositions 1 and 2 imply that the incumbent chooses to “pay” for the increased re-election 
probability by deviating from both his intra- and intertemporal first-best allocation of resources. We 
note that he could have increased the re-election probability by deviating only along the intra-period 
dimension. It turns out, however, that the cost to the incumbent of a given increase in Π is minimized 
when the distortion incurred due to polarization is smoothed with an intertemporal distortion caused 
by debt. Thus, debt allows the R-incumbent to increase the gap between  f1  and g1 by means of a jump 
in f1  (i.e. proposition 3) which is not fully compensated by a similar drop in g1. 
Our analysis can be summarized by Figure 3.10 In this figure, the intra-period indifference 
curves of the R-incumbent are denoted I, II, III and IV. The period 2 expansion path of the potential D-
successor is given by EPD, while the expansion path of the R-government in the case of 0=γ  (i. e. 
when Π  is exogenous) is given by 
0
REP =γ . The benchmark solution of a certain re-election for the 
R-incumbent is given by point BR on the b = 0 budget line (in both periods). As explained above, the 
R-incumbent would also choose point BR in period 1 when Π  is exogenous and satisfies 10 <Π< . 
Then the period 2 allocations would be either in point BR if R wins the election or in point BD if D 
wins. 
 Given that the R-incumbent can influence Π , the optimal period 1 allocation is given by R1. 
Comparing to BR, the R-incumbent chooses b > 0, a larger gap between 1f  and 1g  and finally 
Rf α>1 . The R-incumbent now incurs costs in terms of both an inefficient intra-period allocation of 
resources in period 1 and an inefficient intertemporal resource allocation. These costs are worthwhile, 
however, because they are dominated by the increase in expected period 2 utility caused by a higher 
probability for the R2 allocation in period 2 rather than the D2 allocation. 
                                                 
10 Figure 3 is inspired by Figure 1 in TA (1990: p. 44). 
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*** Figure 3 *** 
 
 
4. Final remarks 
 
This paper has put forward a probabilistic voting model where habit formation in the voters’ 
preferences for alternative public goods implies a link from current policies in terms of decisions on 
the composition of public goods and debt to the probability for re-election. A forward-looking and 
output oriented incumbent that faces a probability of being replaced by an alternative government with 
different preferences for the composition of public goods, will act strategically and utilize this link in 
order to increase the probability of re-election. Comparing to either the benchmark case of a certain re-
election or the case of an exogenous probability of re-election (due to 0=γ ), we have shown that the 
incumbent chooses a larger initial period budget share for his most preferred public goods. This pushes 
up all voters’ habit levels for this good. As a consequence, all voters’ assessment of the incumbent’s 
preferred future policy will be more favorable, leading in turn to a higher probability of re-election. 
Moreover, we have also demonstrated that the increased polarization in the resource allocation in the 
initial period is accompanied by a deficit bias. 
 Our predictions call for a search for empirical evidence. As mentioned in the introduction, 
Glaeser et al. (2005) report some striking observations of seemingly surprisingly polarized policies in 
the US. These observations refer to tax policies, however, and not to the composition of public goods. 
Moreover, there are plenty of observations of sustained public deficits in many major OECD 
economies (see for example OECD, 2006) but as surveyed by Persson and Tabellini (2000, section 
13.3.4) it has still proved hard to provide robust empirical evidence for suggested strategic motives.11 
With respect to AT (1990) and TA (1990), their prediction of an inverse relationship between 
the magnitude of the (exogenous) probability of re-election and the size of the deficit has been rejected 
by existing empirical studies. Our findings suggest a quite different relationship, however, i.e. a deficit 
and a polarized resource allocation are means used by the incumbent to increase the probability of re-
election. Thus, we believe that careful empirical analyses of potential co-movements between these 
three variables are warranted. As a motivation for such an effort in the future, we note that our finding 
seems to be in the spirit of the theory of political business cycles and loosely consistent with the 
stylized fact (as presented by Persson and Tabellini, 2000, p: 393) that budget deficits tend to be larger 
during election years.      
    
                                                 
11 One exception is a study by Petterson (2001). Using data for Swedish municipalities, he finds strong support 
for the strategic budget motive suggested by Persson and Svensson (1989). 
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Appendix 
 
Last term on the RHS of (14b) 
In order to determine the sign of the term in brackets on the RHS of (14b), we note that: 
(A-1) DRRD
DRDRDD
RD
D
DR
D
GFGF
GFGF
GFGF 2222
2222
2222
)1(1 αααα −−=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −− . 
Substituting from (9a) and (9b) and using that DR αα −=1 , we rewrite the numerator as 
(A-2) ( )( )( )( )111111 111111 )2)(1()2)(1(
)2()1()2)(1(
ggffgf
ggffgf
DDDD
DDDD
γαγααα
γαγααα
−−−−−−−−−
−−−−−−−− . 
Because 21<Dα  and 02 11 >−− gf , the numerator must be strictly negative, implying that the 
terms in brackets on the RHS of (14b) must be strictly negative as well. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
Proposition 2 hinges on the condition that the term in brackets on RHS of (21) is strictly negative, 
(A-2) 0
1
1
1
1 <⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ Π+Π
dg
dg
df
df . 
Substituting from (13a), (13b), (14a) and (14b), and collecting terms, this condition can be written as 
(A-3) 01111)(1)(
2
1
22
1
22
111
2222
11 <⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −++⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−− DRDRRD
D
RD
D
GG
g
FF
fgf
GFFG
gf γγααγψ . 
By Proposition 1 we have that 11 gf > . Using that the first part of this Appendix proves that the 
expression in (A-1) is strictly negative, it follows that a sufficient condition for (A-2) to hold is 
(A-4)  01111
22
1
22
1 ≤⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ − DRDR GGgFFf . 
Taking into account that 11 gf > , DR FF 22 >  and RD GG 22 > , (A-4) holds if 
(A-5) DRDR GGFF 2222
1111 −≥− , 
which after straightforward manipulations can be written as 
(A-6) 
1
1
1
1
)1)(1(
)1)(1(
)1(
)1(
fb
gb
gb
fb
R
R
R
R
γα
γα
γα
γα
−−−
−−−≤−−
−− . 
This condition is obviously satisfied because 11 gf > . This implies that condition (A-2) and in turn 
Proposition 2 are satisfied as well. 
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Figure 1: Vote share of party D in group j, j = d, r 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The probability that party D wins the election  
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Figure 3: Optimal policies 
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